Transdiagnostic approaches to mental health problems: Current status and future directions. by Dalgleish, Tim et al.
INTRODUCTION
Transdiagnostic Approaches to Mental Health Problems:
Current Status and Future Directions
Tim Dalgleish, Melissa Black, David Johnston, and Anna Bevan
University of Cambridge and The Cambridgeshire and Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Despite a longstanding and widespread influence of the diagnostic approach to mental ill health, there is an
emerging and growing consensus that such psychiatric nosologies may no longer be fit for purpose in research
and clinical practice. In their place, there is gathering support for a “transdiagnostic” approach that cuts across
traditional diagnostic boundaries or, more radically, sets them aside altogether, to provide novel insights into
how we might understand mental health difficulties. Removing the distinctions between proposed psychiatric
taxa at the level of classification opens up new ways of classifying mental health problems, suggests
alternative conceptualizations of the processes implicated in mental health, and provides a platform for novel
ways of thinking about onset, maintenance, and clinical treatment and recovery from experiences of disabling
mental distress. In this Introduction to a Special Section on Transdiagnostic Approaches to Psychopathology,
we provide a narrative review of the transdiagnostic literature in order to situate the Special Section articles
in context. We begin with a brief history of the diagnostic approach and outline several challenges it currently
faces that arguably limit its applicability in current mental health science and practice. We then review several
recent transdiagnostic approaches to classification, biopsychosocial processes, and clinical interventions,
highlighting promising novel developments. Finally, we present some key challenges facing transdiagnostic
science and make suggestions for a way forward.
What is the public health significance of this article?
Traditional diagnostic systems may no longer be fit for purpose for classifying mental ill health,
facilitating understanding of its core underlying biopsychosocial processes, nor driving clinical
developments. Here we propose that ‘transdiagnostic’ approaches have the potential to better
represent the clinical and scientific reality of mental health problems, reflecting the complexity,
dimensionality and comorbidity that is the norm in clinical practice.
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Distress and suffering are an existential cornerstone of the
human condition, yet how we reflect upon and describe the ex-
tremes of our mental duress has varied enormously across history.
For more than 100 years, certainly in the West, the predominant
means of conceptualizing mental health struggles has been to
categorize them within formal taxonomic systems (Kendler, 2009),
organized according to hypothetical distinctions between different
sets of signs and symptoms, and compiled into comprehensive
compendia of psychiatric diagnoses. The current leading such
taxonomies—the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM; now in its 5th edition) and the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD; now in its 11th edition)—are
long-established, have global reach, and exert a profound influence
over the ways in which we understand, assess, and manage mental
ill health.
Despite the historical momentum and widespread influence of
the diagnostic rubric, there is an emerging and growing consensus
that such psychiatric nosologies may be reaching the limits of their
research and clinical utility. In their place, there is gathering
support for a “transdiagnostic” approach that cuts across the tra-
ditional diagnostic boundaries or, more radically, sets them aside
altogether, to provide novel insights into how we might understand
mental health difficulties. This transdiagnostic approach extends
beyond issues of taxonomy. Removing the distinctions between
proposed psychiatric taxa at the level of classification opens up
new ways of conceptualizing the underlying theories and processes
implicated in mental ill health and provides a platform for novel
ways of thinking about onset, maintenance, and clinical treatment
and recovery from experiences of disabling mental distress.
The transdiagnostic field is nascent yet fast-developing. This
Special Section of the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychol-
ogy provides a timely opportunity to take stock of the current state
of transdiagnostic science. In this introduction we review where
the field has come from and where it is heading, highlighting
issues that require some resolution and offering recommendations
for progress.
Diagnostic and Transdiagnostic Approaches
Although attempts to classify mental health difficulties date
back several thousand years, formalized diagnostic models only
emerged properly from the biological and Linnaen botanical clas-
sification systems of the 19th century. Most prominently, Kraepe-
lin’s Compendium der Psychiatrie in 1883 (Compton & Guze,
1995) exerted a profound influence on the development of the
emerging field of clinical psychiatry especially in the United
States, laying the foundation for the publication of the first edition
of the DSM in 1952 (DSM-I, American Psychiatric Association,
1952). In 1980, the publication of the DSM–III outlined for the
first time a thorough multiaxial diagnostic system with carefully
operationalized criteria for a wide range of disorders, with no
allegiance to any theoretical approach aside from a broad biomed-
ical model. The DSM–III was hailed as a “paradigm shift” (Blash-
field, Keeley, Flanagan, & Miles, 2014) for diagnostic psychiatry,
rescuing the profession “. . . from unreliability and the oblivion of
irrelevancy” (Frances, 2009, p. 2). The current instantiation of the
DSM—the DSM–5 – appeared in 2013 after a 14 year gestation
and runs to 947 pages covering some 541 diagnostic categories (up
from 106 in the DSM-I; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The DSM and ICD have evolved into self-perpetuating systems
that now govern and define all aspects of how we conceptualize
mental health. They provide an organizing framework for virtually
all core texts in psychiatry, clinical psychology, and abnormal
psychology (Cosgrove, Krimsky, Vijayaraghavan, & Schneider,
2006; Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009), they guide mental health
training across the helping professions, and they define how we
assess, manage and treat mental health problems worldwide. The
diagnostic systems that they enshrine have created a form of
“epistemic prison” (Hyman, 2010) that constrains health insurance
and pharmaceutical industry practices, is sanctioned and supported
by government and legal policies, and dominates social and public
discourse about mental health and illness, as reflected in art,
literature and the visual media (Ussher, 2010).
There are many factors underscoring this rise to dominance.
Some are certainly sociopolitical (Kawa & Giordano, 2012;
Khoury, Langer, & Pagnini, 2014) with diagnoses offering a
biomedical legitimacy to discourse about mental ill health that has
a broad academic, professional, and social appeal. Others are more
pragmatic as, without doubt, the diagnostic paradigm offers some
clear benefits to clinical and research practice: It provides a lingua
franca for describing clusters of symptoms that facilitates com-
munication between users of services, clinicians and researchers; it
sets out a common metric for research programs; and it provides an
organizing principle for the development and evaluation of
diagnosis-led assessment and treatment approaches (Hayes & Hof-
mann, 2018). Finally, for some, the biomedical model at the heart
of the diagnostic approach also brings a legitimacy to the suffering
that is experienced, reducing stigma and deflecting pejorative
judgments that mental ill health reflects some form of personal
weakness on the part of the diagnosed.
Despite these advantages of the diagnostic paradigm, there is
a gathering apprehension that the taxonomic approach instan-
tiated in the DSM and ICD runs counter to the available clinical
and research evidence and may hamper our understanding of
mental ill health and consequently how we manage and treat
mental distress (Insel, 2014; Kotov et al., 2017). Here we touch
briefly on seven areas of concern that have currency within this
debate. We focus predominantly on so-called common mental
health problems (Craig & Boardman, 1997), captured by the
various diagnoses of mood disorder, anxiety disorder, stressor-
related disorders, and obsessive– compulsive disorders within
the diagnostic manuals, but the arguments of course extend
beyond these presentations.
Seven Challenges for the Diagnostic Paradigm
The Underlying Biopsychosocial Processes are
Transdiagnostic
A perhaps unintended consequence of the psychiatric diagnostic
paradigm is the notion that diagnoses somehow capture or reflect
the underlying reality of the world, carving nature at its joints and
identifying natural kinds of “mental disorder.” This idea stems
from general medicine, where the majority of physical illnesses
and diseases reflect qualitatively different states of health with one
or a small number of identifiable and discrete causes. This is not
the case for mental health problems where it is generally accepted
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that causes are not only complex, multiple and interactive but as
yet poorly understood (Kendler, 2008, 2012). What we know is
that mental ill health prototypically emerges from an interplay
between myriad biological, behavioral, psychosocial, and cultural
processes that do not respect established diagnostic boundaries,
where the interactions are multifarious, and modulated by an
individual’s lifelong experiences of the world.
The Symptom Space is Dimensional
Within the diagnostic manuals, symptoms are thresh-holded,
imposing binary notions of “present” versus “absent” (Regier,
Kuhl, & Kupfer, 2013). Groupings of symptoms deemed to be
present then comprise the different diagnoses albeit with guid-
ance on severity qualifiers for “mild,” “moderate,” and “severe”
manifestations of individual diagnoses. However, evidence
overwhelmingly suggests that mental health symptoms are not
all-or-none phenomena, but are better conceptualized along
continuous dimensions within the population as opposed to
these distinct categorical entities (Brown, Campbell, Lehman,
Grisham, & Mancill, 2001; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikangas,
& Walters, 2005). Indeed, there is a lack of compelling evi-
dence for even a single symptom or disorder being a distinct
category (Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012).1
This imposition of artificial categories onto a multidimensional
space inevitably sacrifices much of the richness of the available
clinical information, contributing to diagnostic instability with
symptoms falling above or below imposed thresholds over time, as
well as reduced interrater reliability as assessors struggle to elu-
cidate whether marginal symptoms cross the designated thresholds
(Markon, Chmielewski, & Miller, 2011). Most importantly, many
individuals experiencing psychological distress fall short of the
criteria for any diagnosis, despite a manifest need for care (Kotov
et al., 2018).
Rampant Comorbidity and Poor Discrimination
Between Supposedly Different Disorders
Comorbidity—when someone presents with a profile of prob-
lems that satisfy the criteria for more than one diagnosis at a
time—is not a problem per se for the diagnostic model, with the
notion of secondary diagnoses and/or complications of primary
problems woven into the fabric of psychiatric taxonomies since the
outset. However, of greater concern is that epidemiological find-
ings reveal that comorbidity among psychiatric diagnoses is the
rule rather than the exception, and single, uncomplicated clinical
presentations are actually relatively scarce (Kessler et al., 2005).
Such comorbidity is associated with greater clinical severity and
functional impairment (Wittchen et al., 2011), higher rates of
symptom chronicity (Rapaport, Clary, Fayyad, & Endicott, 2005)
and a greater detriment to overall quality of life (Hofmeijer-Sevink
et al., 2012). This “rampant” (Clark, Cuthbert, Lewis-Fernández,
Narrow, & Reed, 2017) diagnostic comorbidity suggests that the
normative coexistence of psychiatric disorders must, to a consid-
erable extent, be an artifact (e.g., Maj, 2005) arising from the
structure of the categorical classification system itself, rather than
the co-occurrence of genuinely separable syndromes (van Loo &
Romeijn, 2015).
Massive Heterogeneity Within Diagnoses
Formal diagnoses of different disorders typically comprise a
number of criteria—clusters of conceptually similar symptoms
that are heuristically grouped together. Most criteria contain more
than one symptom and one or more of these symptoms would need
to be present for the criterion to be met. Typically, the overall
diagnosis then further depends on a specified number of criteria
being satisfied. Even for diagnoses where criteria are not explicitly
offered, diagnoses normatively require only a subset of symptoms
from a larger set to be present. This polythetic checklist approach
means that individuals receiving the same diagnosis can present
with very different symptoms such that each diagnostic category
incorporates built in heterogeneity.
To illustrate, within the DSM–5 major depressive disorder
(MDD) diagnosis, two individuals meeting criteria for MDD could
potentially have only one symptom in common from the nine listed
in the Manual. Indeed, when we account for all of the subsymp-
toms and directional qualifiers, there are 16,400 different symptom
profiles that all qualify as MDD (Fried & Nesse, 2015). Such
heterogeneity is orders of magnitude greater for complex criteria-
based diagnoses such as posttraumatic stress disorder where there
are 636,120 permutations that qualify for the diagnosis (Galatzer-
Levy & Bryant, 2013).
How does this play out in actual epidemiological data? In the
Sequenced Treatment Alternatives to Relieve Depression
(STARnD) data (N  3,703), Fried and Nesse (2015) identified
1,030 unique MDD symptom profiles, of which 864 (83.9%) were
endorsed by fewer than six participants, with almost half of the
profiles (501; 48.6%) endorsed by only a single individual. Indeed,
the most common profile was only met by 67 people.
A primary function of any diagnostic system should be to
facilitate our understanding of a complex problem space by orga-
nizing central, recurrent patterns into discrete categories. The data
on heterogeneity cast doubt on whether this pragmatic aim of the
psychiatric paradigm has even come close to being realized.
Incomplete Symptom Capture
A central question for the compilers of diagnostic compendia is
which symptoms to include as prototypical to delineate a given
disorder given that many symptoms of mental health problems also
characterize everyday life; for example, tiredness, low mood, and
so on and many disorders are associated with a multiplicity of
signs and symptoms. The case of depression again provides a
revealing illustration. If we look at established measurement tools
for depression, there are some 280 different instruments developed
in the last century, of which many are still in use (Santor, Gregus,
& Welch, 2006). These assessment instruments differ markedly in
the signs and symptoms that they capture. For instance, Fried
(2017) notes that across the seven most commonly used depression
assessment tools, 52 distinct depression symptoms are measured
(compared with the nine symptoms listed in the DSM–5), with
40% of those symptoms appearing in just one of the seven scales
and only 12% appearing across all seven. Notwithstanding the fact
1 For the DSM–5 there were originally much more radical plans to
incorporate dimensionality, especially within the personality disorders, but
these did not come to fruition (Kraemer, 2007).
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that some of these 280 instruments may have weak clinical valid-
ity, the wide scope of clinical signs and symptoms covered sug-
gests that there is no single set of cardinal symptoms that defines
depression (and by extension other diagnostic categories) and
consequently that the profile outlined in the diagnostic manuals
may be overly narrow or rigid, failing to reasonably capture the
range within the clinical data.2
Phenotypic Plasticity Across Development and The
Life Course
Mental health problems can morph across development and the
life course such that individuals satisfy criteria either for different
diagnoses or present differentially within the same diagnosis
across time; for example, shifting between anxiety and unipolar
depressive disorders (Fichter, Quadflieg, Fischer, & Kohlboeck,
2010), within anxiety disorders (Wittchen, Carter, Pfister, Mont-
gomery, & Kessler, 2000, 2008) or within depressive disorders
(Oquendo et al., 2004). Some of this phenotypic plasticity is a
function of development, but the nature of the diagnostic approach
itself arguably also contributes with its reliance on cross-sectional
“snapshot” dichotomizations of what are in fact dimensional and
dynamic symptom constructs that will wax and wane across time
(Bystritsky, Nierenberg, Feusner, & Rabinovich, 2012).
Diagnosis-Driven Clinical Intervention
A much-vaunted advantage of diagnostic taxonomies is facili-
tated clinical assessment, management and intervention. This has
led, within the domain of psychological interventions which is our
primary focus here, to the establishment of an evidence-base for a
plethora of single-disorder-focused treatment approaches. These
are then endorsed by diagnostically organized guidelines such as
those compiled by the United Kingdom’s National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE; Pilling, Whittington, Taylor,
& Kendrick, 2011). Comorbid conditions are generally either
glossed over, or minimally treated within these intervention pack-
ages and there little attention is paid to symptoms that fall outside
of the diagnostic rubric. However, the majority of mental health
treatments of all types actually appear to be effective across broad
ranges of clinical populations, for example drugs such as selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and benzodiazepines, and
psychological protocols such as cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT),
or extinction-based approaches for anxiety-related difficulties.
There is thus a mismatch between the clinical reality on the ground
and the nature and scope of the recommended interventions. As a
result, much of real-world clinical practice eschews the diagnosis-
led treatment evidence base, preferring instead eclectic combina-
tions of treatment elements tailored to the presentation and formu-
lation of individual clients. This pragmatic approach enables
goodness-of-fit matching of interventions to specific vulnerabili-
ties and processes relevant to the individual, and provides a flex-
ible treatment model that can be applied across a range of presen-
tations including, critically, complex formulations, comorbidity,
and subsyndromal or prodromal symptoms.
A Transdiagnostic Alternative
These diverse concerns about the diagnostic approach stem
somewhat independently from research and scholarship across the
three intellectual domains of classification and nosology, basic
biopsychosocial research, and clinical science. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, therefore, the alternative transdiagnostic approaches that
abnegate the traditional psychiatric paradigm have also evolved
and matured somewhat separately in each of these spheres, as we
highlight below.
Within each of the three domains, the degree to which the
diagnostic model is forsaken and consequently the strength of the
transdiagnostic proposals vary. What we shall call here “soft”
transdiagnostic approaches preserve the underlying diagnostic
classification while seeking to elucidate processes or develop
interventions that have relevance to one or more of the diagnoses
as traditionally formulated. In contrast, more radical, “hard” trans-
diagnostic approaches dispense with the diagnostic system alto-
gether, seeking to replace it with alternative frames of reference
that characterize mental ill health in new ways.
Transdiagnostic Approaches to Classifying Mental
Health Problems
The established diagnostic taxonomy has been generated
through consensual decision-making by groups of experts under
the auspices of learned bodies (Blashfield, 1984). Although this
“authoritative” approach (Krueger et al., 2018) relies on some
empirical data (e.g., the DSM field trials; Regier, Narrow, et al.,
2013), this is secondary to the influence of expertise, tradition and
politics. An alternative approach to the ex cathedra diagnostic
manuals is fully empirical, focusing on the quantitative structure of
signs, symptoms, and behaviors associated with mental health and
distress, and deriving classification frameworks based on the re-
sultant data.
The overwhelming weight of evidence from decades of such
data-driven efforts indicates that mental health problems are best
conceptualized along a series of continua rather than as discrete
categories (Haslam et al., 2012; Waszczuk et al., 2017). Alterna-
tive categorical delineations of the mental health symptom space,
and hybrid models that combine dimensional and discrete compo-
nents, do have their proponents (Blashfield, 1984; Goekoop &
Goekoop, 2014; Masyn, Henderson, & Greenbaum, 2018) but the
bulk of the evidence favors dimensionality. The broadest empirical
support is that these dimensions are organized hierarchically. Here,
as an illustration of this approach, we focus on one attempt to
generate such a hierarchical framework—the Hierarchical Taxon-
omy of Psychopathology (HiToP; Kotov et al., 2017).
The HiToP architecture (see Figure 1) emerges from multiple
data sets with a combined sample size of over 100,000. HiToP
includes a general factor of psychopathology at the apex, followed
by a number of broad dimensions of disorder at the next level—
spectra—including, for example, internalizing and disinhibited/
externalizing problems. These higher-level spectra sit above
lower-order dimensions that align with subsets of traditional diag-
noses or disorders that tend to co-occur (Slade & Watson, 2006).
These syndrome-level dimensions themselves sit above lower-
order levels of symptom components and individual signs and
symptoms.
2 These concerns about heterogeneity within diagnoses (see above) and
incomplete capture of the prototypical symptom presentations of different
putative disorders obviously pull in different directions.
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Alternative approaches other than HiToP favor a bifactor struc-
ture where lower-order dimensions are not nested within broader
higher-order factors, but instead explain unique residual variance
that is not accounted for by the higher-order constructs (e.g., Caspi
et al., 2014; Lahey et al., 2012; Snyder, Young, & Hankin, 2017).
The breadth of ambition varies across dimensional approaches,
with HiToP aspiring eventually to guide clinical assessment and
intervention (Ruggero et al., 2019) and accommodate dimensions
of personality as well as developmental trajectories, including
cognitive risk dimensions (Kotov et al., 2017; Schweizer, Snyder,
Young, & Hankin, 2020), whereas other approaches are somewhat
narrower in scope (Craddock & Owen, 2010).
There are myriad advantages to such dimensional frameworks.
They are firmly grounded in empirical science, therefore not only
reflecting the underlying dimensional nature of the explicanda but
also sidestepping many of the sociopolitical concerns that dog the
traditional “top-down” diagnostic model. They appear to have
greater reliability than discrete diagnoses, both between raters
(Markon et al., 2011) and across time (e.g., Eaton et al., 2013). A
dimensional structure also seems to map more closely onto under-
lying biopsychosocial processes (e.g., Weinberg, Kotov, & Proud-
fit, 2015) and both genetic (e.g., Hicks, Foster, Iacono, & McGue,
2013; Kendler et al., 2011) and environmental (e.g., Keyes et al.,
2012) vulnerability factors. Dimensions also provide a more com-
pelling framework for thinking about the course of mental health
difficulties as they fluctuate across time, in contrast to categorical
thresholds with their imprecise notions of “in episode,” remission,
and recovery (Kotov et al., 2017).
The dimensional architecture is additionally able to deal with
many of the structural issues that bedevil diagnostic taxonomies.
Comorbidity is accounted for by higher-order dimensions that
code regularities across related lower-order constructs and the
dimensional nature of lower-order component and symptom-level
layers provides a level of description that captures the broad
heterogeneity that characterizes diagnoses.
Clinically, the dimensional taxonomy has potential advantages.
Arguably, dimensional approaches lie at the heart of clinical practice
where critical triage decisions revolve around whether to intervene
and, if so, what level of intervention is indicated, based on severity of
symptoms or clusters of symptoms (Helzer, Kraemer, & Krueger,
2006; Ruggero et al., 2019; Waszczuk et al., 2017).
A final potential strength of the dimensional approach, as op-
erationalized within HiToP, is that it reflects the efforts of a
consortium of like-minded researchers, numbering more than 70,
with backgrounds in diverse disciplines. The size of the task—to
comprehensively map the symptom space of mental health—
requires this kind of collaborative effort. The historical and polit-
ical momentum behind the currently dominant diagnostic model
requires a broad, robust, and consensus set of counterproposals of
the sort that are unlikely to emerge from more localized classifi-
cation efforts.
The dimensional hierarchical paradigm is not without its issues.
At present, despite their overt reliance on data-driven, empirical
analysis, the focus of dimensional approaches is nevertheless pre-
dominantly to reorganize the same symptom space that is the
purview of the diagnostic approach. Consequently, the explicanda
Figure 1. The hierarchical taxonomy of psychopathology (HiToP; Kotov et al., 2017). MDD  major
depressive disorder; PD  personality disorder.
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remain a function of the nonempirical top-down choices about
which symptoms are central to mental ill health, that originate with
and characterize the psychiatric model. Potentially, empirically
driven or theoretically aligned approaches to identifying the range
of relevant signs and symptoms would generate a somewhat dif-
ferent hierarchical structure.
A related issue concerns the interaction between different di-
mensional components. Clinical data reveal that symptoms interact
with each other as networks of associated problems in theoretically
meaningful ways; for example, sleep problems might drive low
mood and poor concentration (Borsboom, 2017; Borsboom &
Cramer, 2013). Indeed, proponents of network approaches argue
that apparent higher-order dimensions or categories of symptoms
such as diagnoses may simply emerge from the proliferation of
chain reactions of symptoms reciprocally activating each other
(Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas, & Borsboom, 2010). According
to this analysis, the nature and dynamics of these interactive
networks should be the prime clinical focus (McNally, 2016). At
present, hierarchical taxonomical approaches are mostly agnostic
about how within- and across-levels of such taxonomies the dif-
ferent components dynamically interact across time, although in
principle the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and a
recent network analysis has attempted to integrate the two (Funk-
houser et al., in press).
It is also, by definition, unclear what constitutes clinical “caseness”
within a dimensional approach. This is not insurmountable—clinical
cut-offs can easily be projected onto individual dimensions—but the
issue quickly becomes challenging once multidimensional constructs
are considered together.
Finally, although the reliance on data-driven approaches to
compile the hierarchical taxonomy represents an advance over the
decision-by-committee model of the diagnostic manuals, it never-
theless remains atheoretical. Without theory, there is an explana-
tory vacuum concerning why dimensions are organized as they are,
or about what determines an individual’s clinical presentation in
terms of his or her positioning on multiple dimensions. In terms of
psychological interventions, the absence of theory makes it diffi-
cult to see how the dimensional model can easily translate into
novel clinical approaches. Psychological interventions are not con-
ceptualized in terms of symptoms or syndromes, but rather to act
on identified precipitating and maintaining processes that are
deemed to be mutable. Without adequate theory driving interven-
tion development, dimensional approaches will likely struggle in
the same way as diagnostic approaches to bridge the translational
gap (though see Ruggero et al., 2019, for a recent discussion).
Transdiagnostic Biopsychosocial Processes
As already noted, a foundation stone of the transdiagnostic
approach is that the risk, protective, and maintenance factors and
processes implicated in mental health problems, whether they be
biological, socioenvironmental, or psychological, show no speci-
ficity for particular diagnostic disorders but rather appear to oper-
ate across traditional nosological boundaries (Buckholtz & Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2012). Quantitative and molecular genetic studies
(e.g., Otowa et al., 2016; Pettersson, Larsson, & Lichtenstein,
2016), structural and functional brain research (e.g., Baker et al.,
2019; Goodkind et al., 2015; McTeague et al., 2017; Meyer, 2017;
Shanmugan et al., 2016; Swartz, Knodt, Radtke, & Hariri, 2015),
studies investigating the influence of environmental factors such as
poverty, discrimination, loneliness, aversive parenting, and child-
hood trauma or maltreatment (Green et al., 2010; Käll et al., 2020;
Keyes et al., 2012; Lehavot & Simoni, 2011; Sunderland et al.,
2016; Wiggins, Mitchell, Hyde, & Monk, 2015), and investiga-
tions of psychological processes (Gellatly & Beck, 2016; Hayes &
Hofmann, 2018; Shanmugan et al., 2016; Sharma et al., 2017;
Wahl et al., 2019), all support biopsychosocial factors that tran-
scend diagnostic precincts. Indeed, to date no biological markers
or cognitive processes have been identified that are uniquely
associated with a specific disorder (Kupfer, First, & Regier, 2002;
Widiger & Samuel, 2005).
This transdiagnostic picture led the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH) in 2009 to “Develop, for research purposes, new
ways of classifying mental disorders based on dimensions of
observable behavior and neurobiological measures” in the form of
the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), thus abandoning the diag-
nostic approach that it had championed for the previous three
decades. The RDoC framework (Insel et al., 2010) is an epistemic
infrastructure that parses mental health complexity into six su-
praordinate domains (see Supplementary Table S1): positive va-
lence systems, negative valence systems, cognitive systems, systems
for social process, arousal/modulatory systems, and sensorimotor
systems, each divided into a number of constructs and subconstructs
(e.g., negative valence systems includes constructs such as “acute
threat,” “sustained threat,” and “loss”) that can be interrogated at
different units of analysis, comprising: genes, molecules, cells, cir-
cuits, physiology, behavior, self-reports, and paradigms.
Within each unit, elements for potential investigation are iden-
tified; for example, “avoidance” as a unit of behavior relevant to
the construct of acute threat. RDoC builds on previous, albeit more
localized, efforts to identify transdiagnostic processes such as
Harvey and colleagues’ ground-breaking 2004 book (Harvey, Wat-
kins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004) that identified a portfolio of
transdiagnostic cognitive processes (e.g., selective attention, over-
general memory, repetitive negative thinking) that manifest in both
clinical (i.e., diagnosed) and nonclinical samples, and that had
been implicated across four or more disorders (see Supplementary
Table S2). This initiative formed the basis for a swathe of process-
driven interventions either focused on individual processes that
have a transdiagnostic reach, for example memory specificity
training (Werner-Seidler et al., 2018), attentional bias modification
(MacLeod & Clarke, 2015), interpretive bias modification for
specific processes such as repetitive negative thinking (RNT;
Hirsch et al., 2020), attentional control training for cognitive
anxiety sensitivity treatment (Allan, Albanese, Judah, & Schmidt,
2020), or that encompass a broader set of processes within the
context of established intervention paradigms, for example rumi-
nation focused CBT (RfCBT; Watkins, 2016) or augmented de-
pression therapy (ADepT; Dunn et al., 2019), along with process-
based CBT more broadly (Hayes & Hofmann, 2018).
The rationale for RDoC (and related efforts) is to provide a
framework for research into the biopsychosocial substrates of
mental ill health. This ambition is deeply laudable but it also raises
an interesting and challenging question—how do we decide what
constructs to include? RDoC identifies a number of inclusion
criteria. Most central is the judgment that a construct is “relevant”
to understanding some aspect of “psychopathology” (Brent et al.,
2018; Morris & Cuthbert, 2012). But, of course, this judgment
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rests on elucidating responses to two issues at the heart of the
discipline—how we define “relevance” and how we characterize
psychopathology.
The characterization of psychopathology is admirably open-
ended in the RDoC. They argue persuasively that the priority is to
facilitate the evaluation of hypothesis-driven research questions
that pertain to clinically significant symptoms or dysfunction. It is
therefore as legitimate to look at symptom dimensions (for in-
stance, at any level of a hierarchical framework such as HiTOP) as
to consider clusters of classically defined DSM disorders (Cuth-
bert, 2015), or even presumably single disorders.
With respect to “relevance,” RDoC characterizes constructs as
relevant to psychopathology as a function of “. . . increasing
deregulation in functionality that can be construed as falling at
one extreme or the other of the normal distribution” (Cuthbert,
2015; p. 95). This raises the question of what constitutes a dys-
functional (“deregulated in functionality”) process. It seems clear
that, despite RDoC’s claims, falling at an extreme of the normal
distribution is not always itself sufficient without some additional
notion of impairment or maladaptiveness (Wakefield, 2014). For
instance, extreme avoidance of threat is adaptive when in a highly
threatening environment such as a combat zone but arguably
becomes maladaptive in low-threat contexts (Berenbaum, 2013).
Furthermore, even if one-tailed of the normal distribution does
reflect dysfunctionality, that does not mean that both tails do; for
instance, poor working memory may be dysfunctional, but at the
other extreme it is unlikely to be a source of concern, however
excellent it is (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013).
Finally, constructs do not even have to fall at extremes of the
distribution under any circumstances to be relevant to psychopa-
thology. The first two RDoC domains—negative and positive
valence systems—combine identified processes (e.g., attention)
that acting upon particular content (positive or negative informa-
tion) to organize constructs where it is perhaps easier to see how
extremities of the distribution of operation may be dysfunctional
(although see the attentional bias example below). However, other
RDoC domains—cognitive systems, social processes, and so
forth—eschew content entirely. This means that processes within
these domains could be operating entirely normatively but on
dysfunctional content and it is the latter that confers the “rele-
vance” to psychopathology. Indeed, this interaction between nor-
mative processes and difficult content is a cornerstone of most
cognitive models of emotional disorder (Beck, Rush, Shaw, &
Emery, 1979; Power & Dalgleish, 2015). For instance, having an
entirely normative ability to understand one’s own agency (an
RDoC element) while trapped in a coercive relationship where one
is disempowered, reflects the operation of a normative process in
a dysfunctional context. Here, arguably, the process-content inter-
play of self-perceived disempowerment is profoundly relevant to
understanding the mechanisms underlying any psychopathological
response.
Relatedly, different RDoC constructs, each operating within
normative ranges, may interact with each other to generate dis-
turbed or dysfunctional responses relevant to psychopathology; for
instance, for some individuals (those with depression or vulnerable
to manic episodes) rewarding experiences might be experienced as
threatening, leading to avoidance behavior, without any abnormal-
ities in the functioning of the positive or negative valence systems
themselves. Finally, RDoC constructs operating within the norma-
tive range may nevertheless be relevant to understanding risk or
vulnerability to mental health problems. For example, those pro-
cesses may represent diatheses such that encountering a particular
context will precipitate the onset of difficulties.
If we do set aside the criterion that the processing constructs
themselves have to be operating “abnormally” (i.e., at extreme
ends of the normal distribution), this means that we are left with no
obvious way to construe a given construct as problematic or
dysfunctional. Similarly, it becomes impossible to apply cut-offs
to define, for example, mild, moderate, or severe levels of dys-
function. Indeed, once we relax the “abnormality criterion,” it
becomes difficult to rule out almost any process as relevant to
psychopathology due to the systemic nature of the majority of
mental health problems where the multiplicity of mental opera-
tions are implicated. If this is the case, then initiatives such as
RDoC will de facto eventually spawn frameworks for conceptu-
alizing the different levels of processes involved in human mental
life, rather than anything specific to psychopathology. This would
arguably edge RDoC and like systems toward unfalsifiability in
terms of their stated aims as it would be unclear what would
constitute an irrelevant process.
Part of this problem lies with the boundary conditions around
the concept of “relevance” itself. Across the developmental trajec-
tory that RDoC promotes (Casey, Oliveri, & Insel, 2014), there
will be countless factors and processes associated with either the
outcome of mental health problems or the risk thereof. All of these
constructs are therefore “relevant” in the broadest sense but with-
out appropriate theories about the etiology of particular difficul-
ties, it is hard to distinguish processes that are proximally causal
from those that are either distally causal or merely associated with
mental health problems. For example, an attentional bias toward
threat (an RDoC subconstruct) seems clearly associated with many
anxiety- and stressor-related conditions (Mogg, Mathews, & Ey-
senck, 1992), and has been shown (in experimental manipulations)
to elevate feelings of anxiety (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell,
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). This has led to a plethora of ‘cog-
nitive bias modification’ interventions to retrain the attentional
system away from threat as a putative treatment for anxiety (Ma-
cLeod & Clarke, 2015). However, to date these approaches appear
to have limited longer-term impact on anxiety symptoms (Cristea,
Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Jones & Sharpe, 2017). Why might this
be? Cognitive theories of anxiety disorders would argue that much
of the attentional bias is driven by deep-rooted beliefs or models of
the world that confer danger on the stimuli that are attended to
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Wells & Matthews, 1994) and so the deep
cause of the anxiety problems is the possession of such beliefs.
Consequently, retraining attention away from threatening stimuli
will only have short-lasting effects on anxiety as relatively quickly
the underlying belief representations will simply recalibrate the
attentional system to be alert for the specified dangers once more.
An analogy would be the common experience of preferentially
noticing other cars on the road that are the same as, say, one’s own
red Jeep. You could train your attention system away from red
Jeeps and toward blue Land Rovers, but as long as you continue to
drive about town in your Jeep it is most likely that you’ll soon be
noticing other Jeeps again. However, if you traded in the Jeep and
acquired a new blue Land Rover, then the attentional bias for Jeeps
would eventually fade away. It is the ownership of the Jeep that is
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central here and the attentional bias for Jeeps simply flows from
that.
Aspiring to a deeper understanding of causality when consider-
ing the role of transdiagnostic biopsychosocial processes raises
another question. How do we distinguish causal processes that are
relevant to developing clinical interventions from those that are
perhaps less helpful? Wakefield (2014) uses the analogy of a plane
crash. Both a failed engine, for example, and gravity are causally
involved in the crash, but efforts to understand what went wrong
and how to use those insights to prevent future crashes are better
focused on the engine’s vulnerabilities rather than gravity. To
develop interventions, therefore, we need to focus on causal pro-
cesses that are tractable and malleable through intervening, as
opposed to those processes that are relatively immutable. Harvey,
Murray, Chandler, and Soehner (2011) make a related point dis-
tinguishing between processes that are “descriptively transdiag-
nostic” (i.e., present in a range of diagnoses), from those that are
“mechanistically transdiagnostic” (i.e., reflecting a causal, func-
tional mechanism).
Finally, other thorny issues pertaining to process causality that
present a challenge for how we map processes onto mental ill
health presentations concern how to make sense of multifinality—
whereby the same causal pathway appears to lead to a range of
different mental health difficulties—and equifinality whereby mul-
tiple causal pathways appear to give rise to the same outcome
(Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996).
As with the pioneering approaches to transdiagnostic nosology,
RDoC seeks to maintain a theoretical neutrality. This reticence of
RDoC to align itself with any given theoretical paradigm is un-
derstandable, and echoes the philosophy of the post-DSM–III
approach in the DSM, but it is questionable whether any such
endeavor that aspires to address questions of causality and mech-
anism with a view to capitalizing on those insights to develop
novel process-based interventions can really succeed without clear
theoretical principles that provide a basis for sorting the mecha-
nistic wheat from the chaff, even if those theories will inevitably
require refinement over time (Mansell, 2019).
Transdiagnostic Clinical Approaches
Transdiagnostic clinical interventions that “. . . apply the same
underlying treatment principles across mental disorders, without
tailoring the protocol to specific diagnoses” (McEvoy, Nathan, &
Norton, 2009, p. 21), have evolved over the last 20 years in parallel
with, but mostly independently from, the developments in trans-
diagnostic nosology and process-based science outlined above.
The post-DSM–III impetus has come from two sobering aspects of
clinical reality. First, the aforementioned rampant comorbidity and
pervasive heterogeneity of clinical presentations, which ensures
that tailored single diagnosis-led protocols often struggle to ad-
dress the range of problems with which clients present. Second, the
real need to do more to improve the effectiveness of our psycho-
logical (and pharmacological) interventions, where even our best
available diagnosis-led treatments only achieve clinical recovery
for 40–70% of patients, depending on their primary diagnosis,
with people suffering complex comorbid conditions faring signif-
icantly worse (Moses & Barlow, 2006). The primary rationale for
transdiagnostic clinical interventions therefore is that they should
better address the heterogeneity and comorbidity that is the modal
presentation in real-world services, thus delivering improved clin-
ical effectiveness (Ellard, Fairholme, Boisseau, Farchione, & Bar-
low, 2010).
Transdiagnostic psychological interventions fall into two broad
categories (Meidlinger & Hope, 2017; Sauer-Zavala et al., 2017).
Universal interventions such as the Unified Protocol for Transdi-
agnostic Treatment of Emotional Disorders (Barlow et al., 2010)
promote a one-size-fits-all approach where all clients receive the
same set of therapeutic elements that have been carefully selected
to have the broadest applicability across diagnoses. The fact that
practitioners can adopt such universal approaches without modi-
fication for a wide range of mental health conditions has a number
of practical advantages. Clinical application is easier as there is no
bespoke selection of intervention elements. Clinical training is also
facilitated thus minimizing barriers to dissemination, compared
with standard training models that involve learning multiple treat-
ment protocols for different disorders (Steele et al., 2018). How-
ever, a drawback of universal approaches is that their very univer-
sality precludes tailored selection of treatment elements to the
particular presentations of individual clients.
In contrast, modular approaches, such The Modular Approach to
Therapy for Anxiety, Depression, Trauma, or Conduct Problems
(MATCH-ADTC) for children (Chorpita, Daleiden, & Weisz,
2005b) and the Shaping Healthy Minds protocol targeting the same
range of problems in adults (Black et al., 2018), comprise sets of
evidence-based self-contained functional units (therapy modules)
that can operate independently and be delivered flexibly, so that
module selection and order are tailored to the needs of each client.
For example, Evans et al. (2020) present the potential application
of the MATCH-ADTC protocol for children with severe irritabil-
ity. Modular interventions are more challenging to deliver than
universal protocols, requiring algorithms to match module delivery
to the separate requirements of each client, but this in principle
comes with a better goodness-of-fit between the therapy and the
individual clinical presentation (see Supplementary Table S3 for
an outline of the intervention components in selected universal and
modular transdiagnostic approaches).
Transdiagnostic interventions also vary in their breadth of ap-
plication (Craske, 2012). Some focus on a relatively narrow range
of clinical presentations such as Fairburn’s transdiagnostic ap-
proach to eating disorders (Fairburn, Cooper, & Shafran, 2003),
whereas other approaches have a much broader purview, for ex-
ample Transdiagnostic Group CBT for anxiety (Norton, Hayes, &
Hope, 2004). There is an obvious trade-off, with greater breadth
meaning that the intervention is perhaps less tailored for the
specifics of any individual constellation of symptoms or disorder.
Numerous systematic reviews and meta-analyses (Andersen,
Toner, Bland, & McMillan, 2016; Newby, McKinnon, Kuyken,
Gilbody, & Dalgleish, 2015; Newby, Twomey, Yuan Li, & An-
drews, 2016; Pearl & Norton, 2017; Pa˘sa˘relu et al., 2017; Reinholt
& Krogh, 2014) broadly support the equivalence or superiority of
transdiagnostic psychological treatments over comparison or con-
trol interventions (comprising either a diagnosis-specific interven-
tion control, treatment-as-usual, or a waitlist control; summarized
in Supplementary Table S4). As with all interventions, the nature
of the comparison condition, and of the trial design more gener-
ally, are critical to evaluating efficacy and effectiveness. For
example, one would not necessarily expect transdiagnostic inter-
ventions to be more efficacious than single-diagnosis-led protocols
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for what one might characterize as the primary clinical (diagnostic)
problem that the client presents with. Going forward, it therefore
seems essential that the field develops consensus criteria for what
would constitute compelling evidence that a transdiagnostic inter-
vention is successful.
What Would Constitute Success for a
Transdiagnostic Intervention?
Ever since Saul Rosenzweig pronounced Lewis Carroll’s Dodo
bird verdict—“Everybody has won and all must have prizes”—on
the field of psychotherapy, it has generally been accepted that a
significant proportion of the variance in psychotherapy effective-
ness can be attributed to “common factors” (Cuijpers, Reijnders, &
Huibers, 2019; Norcross & Wampold, 2011), such as patient
expectations, structured regular sessions and the client–therapist
relationship, that are shared by all psychotherapies (Chambless,
2002; Luborsky, Singer, & Luborsky, 1975). In addition to com-
mon factors, there are shared principles across interventions within
each psychological therapy model—what we shall call “common
processes.” For example, CBT includes common processes that are
shared by most, if not all, diagnosis-led CBT protocols (Hayes &
Hofmann, 2018; see Supplementary Table S2). The combined
contribution of these common factors and common processes to
therapeutic outcomes has clear implications for understanding and
developing any new interventions including transdiagnostic pro-
tocols, where arguably such components deliver much of the
clinical impact. Additional efficacy is then delivered by specific
therapy ingredients tailored to particular clinical presentations
(e.g., depression, panic)—what we shall call for the present pur-
poses “diagnosis-specific processes.” Transdiagnostic protocols
are predicated on the assumption that they contain such diagnosis-
specific therapy ingredients for multiple disorders, whereas single
diagnosis-led interventions heavily focus on diagnosis-specific
processes only for the primary disorder that they target.
In Figure 2, inspired by DeRubeis, Gelfand, German, Fournier,
and Forand (2014), to understand the impact of these different
processes on clinical outcomes, we consider the putative contri-
butions to therapeutic efficacy (using CBT as an exemplar) of
common factors, common processes, and diagnosis-specific pro-
cesses, for hypothetical patients presenting with comorbid clinical
problems. In other words, where there is an identifiable primary
problem or disorder (e.g., depression) that would inform choice of
a diagnosis-led treatment, alongside comorbid difficulties (e.g.,
panic, social anxiety) that arguably also require intervention.
Figure 2 therefore compares a hypothetical diagnosis-specific
CBT intervention targeted at a “primary diagnosis”3 against, both
universal and modular hypothetical transdiagnostic CBT interven-
tions, which both target primary and comorbid diagnoses equally.
We compare all three of these active CBT interventions against
both a placebo- or attention-control condition (i.e., something that
includes common factors but not common processes or diagnosis-
specific processes), and a wait-list control that lacks common
factors, and any active processes.
For all of these five interventions and comparison conditions,
there will be a proportion of patients who do not respond, showing
no remediation of symptoms, either because their problems are
intractable or because they are unable to engage with the interven-
tions for practical or psychological reasons.4 These nonresponders
aside, Figures 2A and 2B illustrate the predicted proportion of
therapeutic response, for the remaining patients, offered by the
different hypothetical intervention protocols for the primary diag-
nosis and comorbid disorder(s), respectively.
The figure illustrates a number of important points. First, for all
conditions there will be a proportion of patients who spontane-
ously remit irrespective of the help they receive. Second, both
diagnosis-specific and transdiagnostic CBT interventions should
outperform wait-list and attention-control comparison conditions
for both primary and comorbid diagnoses due to the common CBT
processes that the three active interventions share and which the
control conditions lack—a conclusion broadly supported by the
literature (e.g., Newby et al., 2015; Supplementary Table S4). As
a consequence, the lion’s share of the variance in treatment re-
sponse would be predicted to be comparable across these three
active interventions and is accounted for by the combination of
therapeutic nonresponse, spontaneous clinical remission, or the
impact of shared common factors and common processes. Finally,
as a result, the potential differences between the three active
interventions are predicted to not only be small but also likely to
differ as a function of whether we are considering the primary
disorder or the comorbid difficulties with diagnosis-specific inter-
ventions likely to be more efficacious for the former, and transdi-
agnostic approaches more efficacious for the latter.
Of course, the figure is hypothetical but if the broad principles
are true, this has a number of key implications for how we evaluate
transdiagnostic clinical interventions:
1. The critical comparison for evaluating emergent transdi-
agnostic interventions should be against current gold-
standard diagnosis-led approaches (Sauer-Zavala et al.,
2017; Watkins, 2018). This has rarely been the case, to
date (Supplementary Table S4). However, when consid-
ering this critical comparison, it is likely that for identi-
fied primary disorders, transdiagnostic approaches will
actually be less efficacious than established diagnosis-
specific treatments. Furthermore, for any comorbid dis-
orders, the shared presence of both common factors and
common processes across both diagnosis-specific and
transdiagnostic interventions means that, although one
would expect an efficacy advantage for transdiagnostic
interventions due to their inclusion of a broader portfolio
of treatment elements targeting diagnosis-specific pro-
cesses, the effect size of such an advantage is likely to be
small (Craske, 2012).
2. This has significant implications for clinical trial meth-
odology within the transdiagnostic domain. First, evalu-
ated clinical outcomes in trials will need to encompass
not only the primary disorder but also any comorbid
difficulties, if the benefits of transdiagnostic approaches
3 We have used the terminology of primary and comorbid diagnoses or
disorders for ease of illustration but in principle the same points can be
made for symptom clusters or dimensions.
4 It is to be hoped that it is possible that precision medicine initiatives
(e.g., Cohen & DeRubeis, 2018) will match individuals to interventions
better suited to their specific difficulties to reduce the proportion of
non-responders, although the clinical benefits of this approach are yet-to-be
realized.
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are to be revealed. Second, novel trial designs will be
required; for instance, hybrid designs comprising a non-
inferiority component for comparing the transdiagnostic
intervention relative to the diagnosis-led treatment for a
primary disorder, alongside an additional superiority de-
sign component (favoring the transdiagnostic interven-
tion) for the comorbid problems. Finally, even for this
superiority component, hypothesized effect sizes are
likely to be small and consequently requisite sample sizes
will need to be large to provide adequate statistical
power.
3. The likely small differences in efficacy between transdi-
agnostic approaches and established diagnosis-led inter-
ventions highlight the need for any proper evaluation of
the utility of the transdiagnostic approach to extend be-
yond simple efficacy (Meidlinger & Hope, 2017; Wat-
kins, 2018). As already noted, transdiagnostic interven-
tions in principle confer significant advantages in terms
of training and dissemination5 and thus implementation
within health care systems. This means that, in the
broader scheme, it is likely more cost-effective to dis-
seminate and implement a smaller set of transdiagnostic
approaches than a much larger set of diagnosis-specific
interventions. The challenge for clinical trialists is to
capture these benefits in their evaluations.
Linking Transdiagnostic Interventions to
Transdiagnostic Processes
Even though many transdiagnostic interventions have an iden-
tified suite of therapeutic processes at their core—whether they be
common factors, common processes, or diagnosis-specific pro-
5 It is important to note that this is not the same as saying that training
and implementation are straightforward in the transdiagnostic domain. We
know that training and dissemination for even more straightforward health-
care approaches to mental health difficulties can prove very challenging
(Proctor et al., 2009). Rather we are saying that it should be relatively
better than the training and dissemination challenge posed when there are
a multitude of similar and overlapping approaches to implement.
Figure 2. Predicted treatment responses (proportions of patients remitted) to diagnosis-specific and transdi-
agnostic interventions, and relevant control conditions. Treatment nonresponders are not included in the figure.
CBT  cognitive-behavior therapy. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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cesses for multiple conditions—empirically demonstrating that
these processes genuinely represent the mechanisms of therapeutic
action has proved a challenge, as it has for the field more generally
(Cuijpers et al., 2019). One way forward is for embedded process-
outcome studies that are theoretically informed and suitably sta-
tistically powered to become mandated for all large-scale clinical
trials. Such studies should eschew simple correlational models,
include a broad array of potential mediators, pay close attention to
both dose-response relationships and temporal associations be-
tween mediating processes and outcomes, and be combined with
adjunctive clinical science involving the experimental manipula-
tion of potential mediators (Lorenzo-Luaces & DeRubeis, 2018).
Care also needs to be taken that putative mediating processes are
properly activated or engaged within the assessment protocols as
opposed to being assessed “cold.” For example, if a treatment
reduces symptoms of emotional distress, such a cold posttreatment
assessment might show that dysfunctional thinking patterns typi-
cally associated with that distress are similarly mitigated. How-
ever, an experimental mood induction designed to activate patterns
of “hot” cognition may reveal that such thinking styles are simply
latent and easily reactivated following a downturn in mood
(Kuyken et al., 2010; Teasdale, 1988).
We also need to move beyond the examination of between-
participants nomothetic processes (e.g., differences in the thera-
peutic alliance) to include consideration of key idiographic pro-
cesses that dynamically shift across time within individuals (e.g.,
how the alliance changes across the course of therapy). Modeling
individual processes across time, as well as general and shared
processes across individuals, can help better understand dynamic
patterns in context to identify maintenance mechanisms and treat-
ment targets (see Woods et al., 2020).
Perhaps a more fundamental process-related concern is the
translational chasm between the process-relevant discovery sci-
ence outlined above and intervention development. Almost all
current evidence-based psychological interventions, with the pos-
sible exception of behavior therapy, have their roots in the clinic
rather than the science laboratory. This is as true of transdiagnostic
approaches where, to date, the vast majority of clinical advances
have emerged through the distillation of existing evidence-based
treatment elements (Chorpita, Daleiden, & Weisz, 2005a) from
established diagnosis-led protocols—predominantly CBT. Very
few, if any, transdiagnostic clinical applications have either
emerged out of, or benefited from, advances in fundamental un-
derlying transdiagnostic biopsychosocial process research, such as
RDoC. Bridging this translational gap is a major challenge.
Five Challenges for Transdiagnostic Science
Having sought to summarize and evaluated the current state of
transdiagnostic science, we now distil five challenges that require
our collective attention if the field is to progress.
1. Development of relevant theory: Much of the transdiag-
nostic field rests on atheoretical foundations, especially
work on core processes and nosology. As we have ar-
gued, although the rationale for this is understandable, it
is not clear how the translational potential of this work
into novel clinical approaches can be fully harvested
without appropriate theoretical frameworks to guide it. A
key challenge therefore is to develop metatheoretical
models that transcend the established diagnosis-specific
frameworks that currently drive clinical translation (e.g.,
Mansell, 2019; Power & Dalgleish, 2015).
2. A focus on mental content: The vast majority of clinical
discourse between practitioners and patients concerns the
contents of thoughts, beliefs, and assumptions about the
world—negative thoughts, ruminative narratives, dys-
functional core beliefs, toxic mental images, and so on.
Engaging with the nature of such mental content is con-
sequently a cornerstone of major therapeutic models
within the field, such as CBT. However, much of the
work on fundamental transdiagnostic processes (e.g.,
within RDoC) is agnostic to the content of the material
being processed (with important exceptions e.g., RDoC’s
“negative valence systems”). It seems deeply unlikely
that a comprehensive understanding of how dysfunc-
tional processes impinge on mental health will be
achieved until the critical interactions between mental
processes and mental content are appropriately under-
stood and elucidated.
3. Setting diagnoses aside: We have drawn a distinction
between “soft” and “hard” transdiagnostic approaches,
with the former retaining a diagnostic framework yet
seeking commonalities across diagnoses, and the latter
more radically seeking to replace diagnoses with alterna-
tive formulations. We submit that a genuine alternative to
the established diagnostic nosologies will only emerge
once harder transdiagnostic paradigms are properly em-
braced.6
4. Developing fit-for-purpose research methodology: The
current prototypical superiority clinical trial design that
focuses on a single primary outcome is arguably unsuit-
able for the proper evaluation of transdiagnostic inter-
ventions. Large-scale hybrid designs (incorporating non-
inferiority components), or other novel approaches
(Blackwell, Woud, Margraf, & Schönbrodt, 2019), with
multiple coprimary outcomes, and appropriate assess-
ment of cost-effectiveness, are indicated. Such trials
should also include mandated embedded process-
outcome evaluations to address questions of what works
for whom, what are the mechanisms of clinical change,
and how intraindividual (idiographic) patterns of rela-
tionships between symptoms and processes change
across time.
5. Prioritizing joined-up thinking: The diagnostic paradigm
is long-lived and has an iron grip on current research and
clinical practice in mental health. The majority of mental
health care systems across the world have diagnoses at
the heart of assessment, clinical practice, and health care
6 It may be that the case for a “hard” transdiagnostic line is more
compelling for common mental health problems (National Collaborating
Centre for Mental Health, 2011)—currently categorized as mood, anxiety,
and stressor-related disorders—than for other constellations of difficulties.
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structure. In terms of clinical research, localized research
efforts are less likely to prise diagnostic fingers free than
larger-scale consortia such as RDoC and HiToP, repre-
senting the collaborative efforts of many international
scientists from multiple disciplines. Joining and support-
ing these consortia, while of course seeking to engage
with any scientific and philosophical differences one
might have with them from within, is therefore to be
highly encouraged. Implementing transdiagnostic ap-
proaches into clinical practice will prove more of a chal-
lenge and rests crucially on the development of robust
transdiagnostic assessment instruments and interventions
that can supplant their diagnostic counterparts. The clin-
ical jury remains out.
Preview of Articles in This Special Section
We have gathered a collection of original articles instantiating
the key themes reviewed above. They provide an exciting snapshot
of the plethora of research focusing on transdiagnostic approaches
to common mental health problems.
In the domain of nosology, Schweizer et al. (2020) have applied
a bifactor approach to internalizing and externalizing dimensions
of cognitive and general psychopathology risk for early adoles-
cents, younger youth, and older youth.
In the process domain, Allan et al. (2020) provide an excellent
example of integrating process measures into clinical trials. They
describe a multimethod investigation on how individual differ-
ences in a key process variable (attentional control) modulate
clinical response in the context of a brief transdiagnostic treatment
for anxiety and depression. Hirsch et al. (2020) describe an exam-
ple of clinical translation from basic science on negative interpre-
tation bias. They found that augmenting interpretation training for
repetitive negative thinking with positive outcome generation and
imagery facilitated more positive interpretations, reduced negative
intrusions after training, and reduced trait rumination. Woods et al.
(2020) modeled individual processes as well as general and shared
processes across individuals with borderline personality disorder,
finding a significant degree of heterogeneity in interpersonal and
affective domains.
In the clinical domain, Evans, Weisz, Carvalho, Garibaldi, Bear-
man, Chorpita, and The Research Network for Youth Mental
Health (2020) report on the evaluation of a modular, transdiagnos-
tic, cognitive–behavioral intervention compared with standard
manualized treatments and usual care for treating youth with
severe irritability across multiple outcomes, informants, and mea-
surement schedules. Finally, Käll et al. (2020) describe the use of
a distillation and matching approach to identifying standardized
evidence-supported interventions to reduce loneliness, by coding
for the presence of cognitive–behavioral practice elements and
maintaining mechanisms.
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